The EU’s Relationship with NATO and OSCE

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most dynamic emerging subfields of the study of European Union (EU) Foreign Policy during the last decade has been the EU’s growing relations with other international organizations (Cameron 2005; Biscop and Andersson, 2008; Jørgensen, 2009; Kissack, 2010; Koops, 2011, 2013; Ojanen 2011; Jørgensen and Laatikainen 2013). Particularly since the adoption of the EU’s first ever European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and its emphasis on ‘an international order based on effective multilateralism’ (Council of the European Union 2003: 9) scholarly analyses of the EU’s interorganizational relations have expanded considerably (Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Wouters et al. 2006, Drieskens and van Schaik 2014). The growing literature reflects the empirical trend of the EU’s interaction with a wide range of international organizations on the ground. This is particularly true for the EU’s foreign-policy initiatives in the field of international security. With the onset of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1991 and the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU has relied largely on in-depth cooperation with other major security organizations, mainly in the field of ‘hard security’ with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the other end of the spectrum, relations with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have provided the EU with an opportunity to advance its competences and policies in the fields of soft security and soft power activities, such as election monitoring, human rights promotion, conflict prevention, and a comprehensive approach to human security (van Ham 2006; Pavlyuk 2013). As Ginsberg reminds us in his extensive study on EU foreign policy, the EU’s influence on and in other international organizations forms an important part of the EU’s overall external impact in the area of peace and security (Ginsberg 2001: 71–2). A more nuanced
understanding of the EU’s ambiguous relations with both organizations therefore also provides important insights into the EU’s expanding foreign and security policy agenda and activities more generally.

This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis and overview of the state of the literature on the EU’s relations with NATO and OSCE. We identify and take stock of four main themes in the growing literature on both partnerships: the evolution and drivers of the respective interorganizational relations, overlapping policy fields, partnership and rivalry, and impact and effectiveness.

First there is a strand of literature that addresses how the relationship between the organizations evolved. This is closely related to the post-Cold War transformations, which occurred in all three security institutions. All three organizations had to rethink their role in European security after the end of the Cold War. In the process, the EU developed a security and defense policy, NATO added new tasks such as crisis management to its traditional role of collective defense and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) institutionalized into an international organization and became the OSCE. Second, a significant number of studies focus on the overlapping policy fields of the organizations. Analyses often address the core tasks of the respective organizations and what the specific organization’s added value is for European security. This theme is related to several new security challenges, which all three organizations in the post-Cold-War era had to face: ethnic conflicts in the neighborhood, transnational terrorism, piracy, cyber warfare, and more recently the Arab revolutions. A third theme in the scholarship is partnership and rivalry between the institutions. It focuses on how the EU can cooperate (and avoid rivalry) with NATO and OSCE in order to address common security challenges. A fourth and final theme is about the effectiveness and impact of EU, NATO, and OSCE cooperation. Especially since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 several studies focus on whether the treaty enhanced the EU’s effectiveness and impact as an actor within OSCE and NATO. After having addressed these four themes for NATO and OSCE, the chapter concludes with an outlook on possible future avenues of research.

THE EU’S RELATIONS WITH NATO

Particularly since the onset of the EU’s ESDP in 1999, scholars have focused to a considerable extent on the evolving and tension-ridden EU–NATO relationship. After a period of complete non-interaction during the Cold War, the EU’s relationship with NATO has, during the last decade, become one of the most densely institutionalized relations between two autonomous organizations. However, although EU–NATO relations yielded fruitful cooperation during the early 2000s, more recent developments and outright rivalries have cast some doubts on the viability and effectiveness of this interorganizational partnership. Despite the emergence of common security threats (such as fragility in the European neighborhood, piracy, cyber warfare and energy security) and financial pressures to cooperate and coordinate more effectively, both organizations have recently resigned themselves to an uneasy co-existence. As a result, the current policy-oriented literature has also taken a pessimistic turn, even by previously enthusiastic supporters of closer EU–NATO relations (see for example Kamp 2013).

Evolution of relations and reasons for interaction

Unlike the relations between the EU and OSCE, which already originated during a period of superpower détente in the mid-1970s (see later), interorganizational relations between the EU and NATO were only possible after the end of the Cold War. Indeed, since the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954 and the
integration of West Germany into NATO in 1955, a clear division of labor was established: while hard security issues became the domain of NATO, the European Community focused on politico-economic integration and soft security throughout the Cold War (Varwick 1998). Indeed, during the Cold War period direct interaction between members of staff of both organizations was explicitly prohibited (Ojanen 2004: 12) and, as a result, cooperation and interaction between both organizations were also non-existent. However, the end of the Cold War not only ended the bipolar international structure, but also opened opportunities for European and transatlantic security organizations to expand their tasks and enter into new policy fields (see later). As a result of both NATO’s post-Cold War reorientation and search for a new raison d’être and the EU’s new-found ambitions in the security field—which found its institutional expression in the creation of the CFSP in 1991—the issue of EU–NATO relations slowly emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. It was particularly the involvement of all European and transatlantic security organizations in the Balkan conflicts between 1992–1995 that has been identified by authors as a first important driver for increased, albeit ad hoc, interorganizational interaction (Lachowska and Rotfeld 1997: 122–3; Caruso, 2007). In his seminal article on interorganizational networking, Biermann (2008) proposes an ‘inter-organizational network’ perspective for explaining the onset of collaborative networking between major Euro–Atlantic security institutions (EU, NATO, Council of Europe, OSCE and Western European Union) as well as the UN after the Cold War. The sine qua non for cooperation between previously autonomous organizations lie, according to Biermann, in domain similarity: ‘Domain similarity implies a shared issue-area with significant, though not total overlap of competences for meaningful cooperation’ (Biermann, 2008: 155). According to this assumption, the post-Cold War move of NATO, WEU, EU and OSCE into the field of crisis management resulted in domain similarity and functional overlap (Biermann, 2008: 156) or functional crossover (Stewart, 2008: 272), which formed the main basis for interorganizational relations.

However, in the case of EU–NATO relations the reasons for cooperation go beyond these general dynamics and are of a more instrumental and pragmatic nature. The vast majority of the literature of the late 1990s and early 2000s points towards the fact that the EU’s decision to launch its own military dimension to its CFSP inevitably raised the question of its relationship with NATO (Wessel 2001; Howorth 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007; Varwick 2005, De Witte and Rademacher 2005; Reichard 2006). The Saint-Malo Declaration of 1998 and the institutionalization of the ESDP from 1999 onwards raised some eyebrows and concerns among transatlantic security analysts—most famously expressed by Madeleine Albright’s (1998) cautioning article in the Financial Times that warned the Europeans not to duplicate, discriminate, or decouple (the infamous ‘three D’s’) from NATO and its member states. At the member-state level, the strong US position and insistence on the ‘three Ds’ also implied the imperative of close NATO–EU relations in military affairs. This approach was strongly supported by the UK and—from 2004 onwards—Poland and the majority of the Central and Eastern European Countries. For France, on the other hand, closer NATO–EU relations were seen as a threat to EU autonomy and, therefore, French officials often tried to keep both organizations apart at the member-state level (Michel 2007; Simon 2013).

From the early 2000s, it became clear that NATO played a crucial role in allowing the EU to build up its military dimension. Closer relations between both organizations were imperative due to political, strategic, and operational reasons (Varwick and Koops 2009; Koops 2011, 2012). On the one hand, at the member-state level, authors argued that US and British traditional skepticism towards an EU-led military policy and their strategic
preferences for NATO made closer cooperation between the EU and NATO unavoidable (Deighton 2002; Reichard 2006; Howorth 2007). On the other hand, NATO acted as a ‘kick-starter’ for ESDP via the Berlin Plus arrangements during the early phase of operationalization. The EU’s two early military missions in the Balkans (Concordia 2003 and Althea since 2004) had to be organized in close cooperation with NATO and through the Berlin Plus arrangements (Kupferschmidt 2006; Pohl 2014). Although 1999–2004 can be seen as one of constructive cooperation, authors have examined more critically the EU’s own ambitions for autonomization from NATO since 2004 (Biscop 2006; Reynolds 2007; Varwick and Koops 2009; Howorth 2007). Reflecting growing NATO–EU rivalries and problems on the ground and at the political level, the literature has been marked in recent years by a pessimistic turn and increasing doubts about the effectiveness and future viability of the relationship (Koops 2012; Kamp 2013).

The reasons for interaction are, therefore, an increase of actor density and functional overlap since the early 1990s, as well as the EU’s own ambitions in the military field, thereby necessitating some sort of interorganizational arrangement between both organizations.

**Overlapping policy fields**

As hinted at already in the previous section, the root of the intensification of relations between all three security organizations has been their parallel post-Cold War focus on the emerging security concept of military crisis management (Lachowski and Rotfield 1997; Reichard 2006; Stewart 2006, 2008; Major and Moelling 2009). Indeed, the convergence of the EU’s newly created CFSP, NATO’s newly redefined post-Cold War raison d’être and OSCE’s comprehensive approach around and towards the new post-Cold War activity of crisis management has been identified by many authors as one of the key drivers behind closer EU–NATO and EU-OSCE interorganizational relations (Biermann 2008, 2009; Koops 2009; Hofmann 2011). In this light, domain similarity (Biermann 2008) and overlap (Hoffmann 2011) have been particularly present in the EU–NATO relationship since the onset of ESDP.

At the same time, some authors emphasize the member-state level and the ambitions by both the UK and US to keep NATO close to the EU in the field of military crisis management (Deighton 2002, Howorth 2003). France, on the other hand, traditionally sought to keep both organizations at arms length and tried to stress the EU’s independence from NATO (Varwick and Koops 2009: 114; Simon 2013).

Although authors have stressed the EU’s deliberate emphasis on a comprehensive approach to security that was intended to be broader than the mostly hard security focus of NATO, the EU’s move into the field of a military dimension nevertheless signified a direct policy overlap with NATO. This also serves as a key explanatory variable for the evolution of rivalrous tendencies (see later). The literature has stressed three different perspectives on the issue of EU–NATO policy overlap. One group of authors has stressed the potential for natural synergies between both organizations (Carp 2006; Cornish 2006; Yost 2007). The key argument put forward was that NATO still had the comparative advantage in the field of intense, large-scale military operations and could therefore support the lighter, more modest EU military ambitions. Authors in this camp have also argued for stronger EU efforts to reinforce NATO’s civilian capacities (Flournoy and Smith 2005; Howorth 2007). Closely related to this perspective, a second view has been to foresee a clear division of labor. This view not only highlights a division according to high intensity crisis management (for NATO) and low intensity civil-military crisis management (EU), but also along geographic lines (the EU focuses on its own neighborhood and Africa, while NATO focuses on Afghanistan, Central Asia,
and emerging transatlantic security threats). More recently, authors have stressed the far-reaching potential for further cooperation, based on both organizations facing the same emerging security threats (Drozdiak 2010). Anti-piracy efforts (Muratore 2010), cooperation in cybersecurity (Veri 2013), anti-terrorism (Knelangen 2005) and energy security (Rühle 2011), but also coordinated approaches to African Union capacity-building (Smith-Windsor 2013) have been some of the key emerging policy fields where the literature has suggested potential policy overlaps and room for cooperation. However, the future of stronger joint engagement in these fields depends on the general tendencies of cooperation and rivalry.

**Cooperation and rivalry**

EU–NATO relations, like any interorganizational relationship, have been affected by both cooperation and rivalry from the very beginning (Albright 1998; Varwick 2005; van Ham 2006; Cornish 2006; Koops 2012). Varwick and Koops (2009) have identified three main periods in the relationship between both organizations: the first phase (from 1990–98) included both organizations’ adaptation to the new post-Cold War security environment and the first initial attempts to coordinate their tentative attempts at military crisis management. The second phase (1999–2003) consisted of NATO’s support to the build-up and operationalization of the EU’s ESDP and of an institutionalization of the partnership through Berlin Plus. Finally, the third phase from 2004 to the present has been marked by increasing informal interactions in the field, but also by impasses at the political level and underlying, as well as open rivalry and competition (Varwick and Koops 2009: 102–10). One could now add a fourth period of both repeated calls for resetting and refocusing EU–NATO relations, as well as a growing sense of resignation about the future impact and effectiveness of the partnership.

The literature is still in its infancy when it comes to theorizing systematically about the causes and facilitating factors for cooperation or rivalry. Drawing on management and sociological theories, authors have stressed that similarities in terms of policy aims, membership, and policy tools can lead to closer cooperation and also intense rivalries (Galaskiewicz 1985; Galbreath and Gebhard 2010). One recent strand of the literature stresses that although NATO–EU relations might be blocked at the formal and political level (due to the Turkey–Cyprus problem, but also due to French maneuverings), the relationship proceeds to work well at the informal levels and at the military level on the ground (Koops 2011; Graeger and Haugevik 2013). Some authors have pointed towards clear incidents of open rivalry and lack of formal cooperation – such as the decision to launch two similar and parallel anti-piracy operations or to engage in a ‘beauty contest’ over airlift support to the African Union in 2005 – whilst other authors point to the general lack of strategic guidance on the future of EU–NATO relations (Simon 2013). The EU’s own autonomization tendencies since 2004 (the last time an operation was conducted through the Berlin Plus arrangement) have also been frequently cited as a reason for interorganizational rivalry (Touzovskaia 2006; Yost 2007; Koops 2011, 2012).

**Impact and effectiveness**

Unlike the case of EU–OSCE relations, where the EU has managed to coordinate its positions and often speaks with one voice, the EU’s coordinated role within NATO has been deliberately kept to a minimum. Allies that are not a member of the EU, in particular, insist on NATO to remain an open and flexible forum for coordination and not one where the EU members should arrive with a pre-formulated position. Consequently, the EU’s impact within NATO remains limited (Varwick and Koops 2009; Graeger and Haugevik 2011, 2013). Yet informal
consultations and ‘corridor diplomacy’ helps to keep the dialogue open. As a result of the crisis in the Ukraine in particular, consultations have been identified and some authors view this external crisis as an opportunity for more intensified joint impact (Gardner 2014).

In terms of assessing interorganizational influence, impact, and effectiveness several research strands needs to be distinguished. Costa and Jørgensen’s volume *The Influence of International Institutions on the EU* (2012) has been one of the more rigorous and theoretically grounded comparative analyses on how other international organizations influence the EU. In the case of NATO, its influence on the EU as a model, enabler and competitor has been pointed out (Koops 2012). Similarly, authors such as Reynolds (2007) or Juncos (2007) have demonstrated the institutional and isomorphic impact NATO has had on the EU. Not only did the institutional set-up of all key ESDP bodies strongly reflect the NATO model, but the EU also organized its first military operations in the Balkans in close cooperation with NATO, including rules of engagement (Juncos 2007).

A second strand of the literature has sought to assess the impact the EU has had on NATO (Jørgensen 2009; 2007). Here the evidence is less clear. Authors have noted the limited influence particularly in the field of the ‘comprehensive approach’ and a ‘Berlin Plus in reverse’ (i.e. giving NATO access to the EU’s civilian capacities) (Carp 2006).

Finally, the literature has slowly, but still unsystematically, sought to address the issue of the overall joint impact and effectiveness both organizations have when working together. Although the early experiences of Berlin Plus operations in the Balkans (Concordia and Althea) have been cited as successes (Kupferschmidt 2006; Koops 2011), the majority of authors have pointed to the limited progress at the strategic level, which ultimately hinders the realization of the partnership’s full potential. Furthermore, the EU’s alleged instrumental approach to using NATO for the advancement of its own actorness has also frequently been cited as a reason for, overall, limited joint effectiveness.

**OSCE**

*Evolution of relations and reasons for interaction*

When the CSCE was established with the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the European Commission and the rotating Presidency of the European Community were involved as negotiators and co-signatories. Compared to the relationship between the EU and NATO, the formal relationship between OSCE and the EU is a relatively old one. At the same time, it should be noted that until the 1990s the interorganizational relationship was rather modest. On the one hand, there were few reasons for interaction because the European Community and the CSCE had clear role divisions – the European Community was primarily concerned with trade and other economic affairs whereas the CSCE focused on security issues. Moreover, the CSCE was not a proper international organization, which made interorganizational exchange impossible by definition. The role of the European Community in the CSCE negotiations and during the first years of its existence is therefore often scarcely mentioned in historical overviews (Maresca 1985; Fry 1993; Korey 1993; Leatherman 2003). On the other hand, there were good reasons for interaction because of the emerging European Political Cooperation (EPC) framework in the 1970s. The (at the time) nine members of the European Community saw the CSCE as an opportunity to implement the EPC. The CSCE actually became the first serious test case for the EPC and it proved to be quite successful. Effective coordination between the nine members took place and enabled a common European position in the negotiations, even to the extent that non-European Community members within NATO showed some unease and suspicion about the European voice (Romano 2009: 169). The importance of the CSCE for the
development of the EPC is reflected in the literature covering the EPC as it unfolded during the 1970s and 1980s (Regelsberger 1988; Cameron 1995: 22; Romano 2009, 2012a, 2012b).

More interaction between the European Community/EU and the CSCE/OSCE emerged in the 1990s. Several reasons for this can be distinguished. First, authors refer to the need to reassess European security as well as the role of the four regional security governance institutions (i.e. EU, NATO, OSCE, and the Council of Europe) after the Cold War had ended. The literature reflects on how the different institutions had to adapt to the new security environment in the 1990s and therefore also had to redefine their relationships towards each other (McInnes 1992; Pugh 1992; Lucas 1993; Kelleher 1995; Bothe et al. 1997). Second, increasing overlap of membership was an important driver for increased interaction (Peters 2004), especially with regard to the eastern enlargement of the EU (Cameron 1995: 29; Wohlfeld 2003: 52). Third, overlapping mandates and policy fields were recognized as reasons for interaction (Peters 2004). And last, but not least, an important reason for interaction was the war in the former Yugoslavia. Both the EU and the OSCE deployed field missions as a result of which interaction and the need for coordination increased (Wohlfeld and Pietrusiewicz 2006: 186; Stewart 2008: 266).

Although interaction between the EU and the OSCE increased in the 1990s, it was the launch of the EU’s security strategy in 2003 that gave an even stronger impetus for further interaction. The endorsement of effective multilateralism as a key element of the EU’s foreign policy led to formal and informal cooperative initiatives with the OSCE. In the slipstream of increased institutional interaction, the literature followed.

Overlapping policy fields

In the literature on EU-OSCE relations an important theme that can be identified is overlapping policy fields. With the launch of its security strategy the EU touched upon threats and challenges, which traditionally were also addressed by OSCE. The EU’s focus on human security led to an overlap with OSCE’s human dimension of its comprehensive security concept (which also includes a politico-military dimension and an economic and environmental dimension). In spite of the fact that both organizations remained very different in legal and political terms, their policy agenda increasingly overlapped. In the literature, the overlap is identified with respect to a variety of topics falling under the human and politico-military dimension, including conflict prevention (Stewart 2008; van Ham 2009: 139; Graeger and Novosseloff 2003: 83), post-conflict rehabilitation (van Ham 2009: 139), election monitoring and assistance (Bakker 2004: 408), terrorism (Bakker 2004: 410), police issues (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005: 341; Bakker 2004: 410), the promotion of human rights and the rule of law (Bakker 2004: 409), the implementation of UN-sanctions (Bakker 2004: 408; van Ham 2009: 139), and democratization (Bakker 2004: 409). This overlap in policy fields, and the resulting issue of cooperation and rivalry (see later) is often analyzed within the context of a specific field mission, such as the mission in Kosovo (Peters 2003: 396; Galbreath and Brosig 2013). It also led to reflections on the identity of both organizations and the question was put forward: what are the core tasks of the EU and OSCE and what is the specific organization’s added value for European security?

Cooperation and rivalry

In the 1990s and beyond, the increasingly overlapping policy fields led to a political discourse stressing the need for cooperation between the EU, OSCE and NATO (Gheciu 2008: 159). With the expanding mandate of the EU in foreign policy the question arose to what extent the EU and OSCE can and
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The EU’s relationship with NATO and OSCE should work together in European security. EU High Representative Javier Solana famously described both organizations as ‘natural born partners’ (Solana 2002). Solana’s qualification was echoed in the literature (Doyle 2002; Wohlfeld and Pietrusiewicz 2006; van Ham 2009). The cooperation between the EU and OSCE since the 1990s is primarily focused on the human dimension of OSCE’s comprehensive security concept. Cooperation has been improved since the EU’s security strategy was launched in 2003. OSCE was mentioned as one of the organizations whose strengthening would be beneficial to the EU (European Council 2003). Without giving details, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy recognized the deepening of the relationship from 2003 onwards (European Council 2008: 11).

Concerns about rivalry or competition are also intrinsically part of the discourse about cooperation between the European security institutions. These concerns have been particularly relevant for the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO and the development of the ESDP (Gheciu 2008: 160). Fears for competition between the EU and OSCE have been less pronounced compared to fears about the EU’s competition with NATO. Nonetheless, the EU’s evolving ESDP led to concerns about competition or conflict between the organizations (Schroeder 2007: 213; van Ham 2009). After all, the cooperation takes place within the context of a relationship between two unequal partners. The EU is the stronger organization (in political, legal, and economic sense) and in many respects has more to offer than OSCE to its member states. In spite of the institutionalization that took place in the 1990s, OSCE is a rather weak organization (Odello 2005; Møller 2012). It lacks a constitutional charter and understaffing, underfunding, and inadequate competences limit the effectiveness of the organization (Møller 2012: 248). In contrast, in spite of the economic and financial crisis the EU is a strong regional organization with a high level of economic integration and an expanding common foreign policy (van Willigen 2014). This means that the EU is able to ignore OSCE if it wishes to do so and to develop its own policies in areas traditionally covered by OSCE (Biscop 2006: 26).

The literature shows a tendency of the EU to use OSCE instrumentally to reach its own foreign-policy goals. The EU’s instrumental use of international organizations has been investigated by Jørgensen (2009). A concrete example in the case of OSCE is the way the EU uses OSCE to get information about a (potential) candidate country for its progress reports. The field missions of OSCE in (potential) candidate countries are well informed and can help the EU in assessing the progress of the country concerned (De Graaf and Verstichel 2008: 266; Galbreath and Brosig 2013: 274). Another example is that OSCE is considered to be very useful for shaping European policy towards the Eastern neighborhood. For example, policy officials often emphasize that communication between OSCE and the Central Asian states is facilitated by the fact that they, as participating states, regard OSCE as their organization, whereas the EU is an external third party. At the same time, it should be realized that OSCE’s involvement in Central Asia has its limits too. The Central Asian governments generally have ‘strong reservations about the OSCE’s involvement within their borders, particularly when it comes to reinforcing democracy, human rights or the role of civil society’ (De Graaf and Verstichel 2008: 267–268).

Impact and effectiveness

On the one hand there is a rich body of literature studying issues related to the impact and effectiveness (or lack thereof) of OSCE (Cottee 2001; Zellner 2007; Ackermann 2012) and the EU in European security affairs. On the other hand, several studies focus on the impact and effectiveness of the
EU within OSCE. In spite of the fact that the EU-members occupy 28 seats (out of a total of 57) within OSCE, most studies are rather negative about the effectiveness and impact of the EU within OSCE. The potential leading role the EU could play in OSCE is often not realized (Lynch 2009: 144). Rivalry and lack of unity and coherence in the EU’s representation is an important cause for the lack of effectiveness (van Ham 2009: 144). The EU 28 often produce positions reflecting the lowest common dominator, and the large number of member states make the EU’s position inflexible (De Graaf and Verstichel 2008: 275). The hope was expressed that the effectiveness of the EU would be increased as a result of the Lisbon Treaty (Stewart 2008: 275). However, the EU’s effective multilateralism towards OSCE seems to be restricted by a predominantly instrumental use of the organization. There is no strategic vision on what kind of an organization OSCE should be (van Willigen 2014).

REFLECTIONS ON FUTURE RESEARCH

The chapter has highlighted that there has been a noticeable interest in and growth of scholarly work on the issue of EU’s interorganizational relations with NATO and OSCE. Given that all three organizations have had a growing interest in advancing their specific security approaches to major issues within and outside the European and Euro–Atlantic area, it is not surprising that they have also engaged in formal and informal interactions. So far the literature offers a wide range of perspectives on the evolution, drivers, and outcome of the EU’s relations with OSCE and NATO, yet the literature remains at a pre-theoretical level, with the main emphasis on policy-oriented analysis, single case studies, or normative and prescriptive think tank reports. In the future, the research field would benefit from a systematic theoretical exploration of the conditions under which the three organizations cooperate, compete, and relate to each other.

So far, the majority of analyses on the EU’s relations with NATO and OSCE tend to adopt an interorganizational perspective that mostly focuses on the interfieratican angle. Further research is needed on the role of core member states in either facilitating or hindering closer relations between the EU and both security organizations. In this light, a thorough application of a multi-level analysis approach (assessing the influence at the international, individual, intra-organizational, and member-state levels) would be an important first step for a more nuanced understanding of the EU’s interorganizational relations.

Despite some major similarities between EU–NATO and EU–OSCE relations, it is important that further research focus on the core differences and the significance of the one-voice factor (Macaj 2012). Although the EU has significant leeway to coordinate its policies within the OSCE, EU–NATO relations remain marked by clear resistance to an ‘EU caucus’ within NATO. More research is needed whether this structural difference also leads to different levels of interorganizational effectiveness and impact.

A clear trend of tensions and inefficiencies in the EU’s relations with both NATO and OSCE is noticeable, and it is also important to keep in mind that sudden shocks in the international or regional environment and unexpected crises might reinvigorate relations (the current crisis in the Ukraine and the largely uncoordinated roles of NATO, the EU and OSCE is a case in point). Future scholars on the topic should keep an open mind about the possibilities for reinforced cooperation, but should also delve more deeply into comparative analyses of the potentials, track-record and limitations of the EU’s interorganizational relations with the other two major security organizations. In so doing, more emphasis needs to be placed on a comparative perspective, instead of focusing on the policies and processes of the EU’s different partnerships in isolation.
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NOTE

1 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was renamed ‘Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 2009.

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